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Abstract 
After the construction of the San Carlos bastion in Alicante in the final decade of 
the seventeenth century, and the great trench which the English built around the 
district of San Francisco during their years of dominance in the War of 
Succession, the waters of the San Blas gully caused serious damage to these 
fortifications of the city and to the trade buildings of the port. In 1772, the 
diversion canal was built. It was designed to divert the riverbed of the gully and 
send the waters directly to the sea. The project had been initially designed by the 
Engineer General, Jorge Próspero de Verboom in 1721. This unique work of 
engineering had some defects, principally in the breakwater which prevented the 
waters from flowing down the former river course. On several occasions, 
the water returned to its original riverbed due to the weakness of the 
breakwater, the narrowness of the channel’s bed and its lack of regularisation, 
causing serious damage to the bastion, the Babel-facing façade, the traders’ 
warehouses and other buildings. This study describes the project that the military 
engineer Leandro Badarán carried out in 1794 in order to technically improve 
this canal and examines his report on the state of the fortifications. Similar works 
built in Spain are also explained. It also analyses the repeated disputes between 
the war department and the port throughout these years over finding a technical 
solution to the problem. 
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1 Introduction 
 “It was said in good humour that this competition was ‘like 
doctors, one contradicts the other causing further damage 
and harm to the sick’”. SHM. Col. Aparici, t. I, fol. 202. 
 
At times, the fortification of bastions meant that rivers and water sources had to 
be channelled and diverted, a practice that mainly affected Mediterranean coastal 
cities. After the summer, swift flowing torrents of water caused considerable 
damage to ditches and foundations, and as a result stretches of wall and other 
fortification works collapsed. In the 18th century this situation worsened, as 
when cities and towns needed to expand and protect themselves sometimes water 
courses and small gullies were incorporated within their walls and  at times these 
could increase and overflow. These channelling works were carried out by 
military engineers whose competence covered a wide range of building skills, 
and they were expert in public works and fortifications. The plans that they drew 
up for the fortified walls of cities addressed all these aspects in a standardised 
manner. The technical training of these engineers was given an enormous boost 
following the arrival in Spain of the Engineer General Jorge Próspero de 
Verboom in 1709 [1]. His technical knowledge and experience gained in the 
Low Countries, a land of canals, locks and innumerable hydraulic engineering 
works was decisive in this field. 
2 Hydraulic engineering works in Spain 
During the reign of Philip II, hydraulic engineering works were planned and 
supervised by military engineers [2]. At this time the work of Juanelo Turriano 
was important as he was responsible for the devising the system that brought the 
waters of the Tagus up to Toledo. The works of containment to control the river 
flow, the Tibi reservoir close to Alicante was another unique example of 
engineering. Work was begun in 1580 by Juan Bautista Antonelli, with his 
cousin Cristóbal Antonelli, continuing the task and it became the most important 
reservoir of its time in the known world. Following the developments in Holland 
and Belgium during the 17th and 18th centuries [3], works were carried out in 
Spain to channel rivers, divert water sources and create dams or build 
breakwaters and other projects in sea ports. This was often for commercial 
reasons as the works made navigation much easier for shipping, and in other 
cases, such as that which concerns us here, the purpose was to prevent damage to 
urban constructions, especially their fortifications. 
     During the 18th century following Verboom’s arrival in Spain, some 
significant works were carried out. This experience of this engineer, who was 
born in Antwerp and who trained at the Military Academy in Brussels alongside 
Sebastián Fernández de Medrano, and had taken part in the campaigns from 
1691–1698 with Van Coehoorn, and in the campaigns of the War of Succession 
in the Low Countries with Sebastián le Prestre de Vauban, was decisive in 
training Spanish engineers of the time [4]. 
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 Figure 1: Canal for navigating the river Ebro in 1749, SGE, Ar.F-T.8-C.3-319. 
 
Figure 2: Diversion of the rivers Ter and Oñar, 1733, SGE, Ar.F-T.8-C.3-582. 
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     Verboom planned and directed some of these engineering works and devised 
and supervised many more. Following his death in 1744, in the second half of 
the 18th century a few projects to divert river sources were implemented, mainly 
at the river mouth. One of these projects was in the vicinity of Amposta at the 
mouth of the river Ebro in 1749 (Fig. 2), designed to allow the passage of ships, 
resulting in several projects directed by Juan Martín Zermeño; works were 
carried out in El Puerto de Santa María in 1721, a project planned by Ignacio 
Sala in order to channel the river Guadalete to its former source; diversion of the 
river Ter where it passes by the Bournonville fortress and the bastion of Santa 
María in Gerona, planned by Andrés de los Cobos in 1733; the diversion of the 
watercourses affecting the fortifications and the port of Cartagena (Fig. 4), which 
was the work of Sebastián Feringán in 1747; the diversion of the rivers Castril 
and Guardal [5]; diversion of the waters of the river Gudalmedina, which 
affected the port of Málaga in 710; or the project for Alicante which concerns us 
here and which will be detailed below. Important canal projects were carried out 
for irrigation purposes, such as that of Seu de Urgell in 1751, the Imperial canal 
in Aragón in 1778, the irrigation canal from Andalucía to Murcia in 1787, and 
navigation works such as those of the Guadalquivir in 1780. 
 
 
Figure 3: Canal for diverting water courses in Cartagena, AGS M, P and D. 
IV-077. 
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3 The Alicante city walls and the San Blas and 
Canicia earthworks 
During the 16th century the Alicante city walls comprised long curtains and 
circular bastion towers which could house artillery. Constructed in the reign of 
Charles V, it was one of the most striking walled fortifications in the Iberian 
peninsula. Towards the end of the century the castle of Santa Bárbara, set on the 
natural height of Benacantil, was reinforced by a bastion front designed by 
Jacobo Palear Fratín, Philip II’s great engineer [6]. In this way Alicante’s 
fortifications were maintained up until the 17th century within the limits defined 
by the earthworks of San Blas and Canicia.  Thus the heavy flows produced by 
torrential rains at the end of the summer did not affect their buildings or 
fortifications. 
     In the last years of the 18th century, work was begun on extending and 
modernising the fortifications. Trade had considerably increased and with it 
numerous warehouses and other buildings had been built outside the walls, 
mainly in the San Francisco neighbourhood [7]. The city walls built in the time 
of Charles V were no longer able to provide adequate resistance to the siege 
tactics of the “Vauban era” and the might of new artillery. The most notable 
project was that designed by Ambrosio Borçano, Senior Engineer and Quarter 
Master General of the Catalonian army. However, expansion of the fortifications 
was accelerated following bombardment of the city by the French fleet in 1691. 
Borçano planned and directed the work on a new bastion facing Bavel beach: the 
San Carlos bastion. 
 
 
Figure 4: City plan, Castle and Port of Alicante, Jorge Próspero de Verboom, 
1721, SGE, Ar.G-T.3-C.3-297. 
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     During the War of Succession the English who had taken the city and the 
castle in 1706, dug a large trench which ran from the San Carlos bastion, leaving 
the Convent of San Francisco outside, and into the interior forming a new 
bastioned front. The line of the trench included the water course of the San Blas 
gully which made a wide curve towards the sea opening out near the San Carlos 
bastion [8]. This arrangement was not at all advantageous for the city and its 
fortification because at times the water levels rose considerably causing torrential 
steams. In later years it would be necessary to resolve the diversion of water in 
both water courses of San Blas and Canicia [9]. 
     The works to open up a new canal in order to divert the source of the San 
Blas gully were planned by Verboom in 1721 (Fig. 1). His proposal was part of 
the General Plan drawn up by the engineer, unquestionably the best project for 
the Alicante fortifications in the whole of its history [10]. 
4 Start of the canal in 1772 
Following some devastating floods such as those of 1752, which seriously 
affected the San Carlos bastion and the trench built by the English in May 1772, 
work began on the long desired canal.  The project was overseen by Antonio 
Marín, Engineer and commandant of the Alicante square. In order to close the 
flow of water to the former water course, a breakwater was built consisting of 
earthworks covered by stone wall which diverted water from the San Blas gully 
directly to the sea similar to Verboom’s original idea in 1721. However opening 
up a new canal was not a satisfactory solution. The terrain consisted of soft rock 
and not earth as was originally thought, and the excavations were extremely 
difficult. Furthermore the river bed had counterslopes and cavities in the area 
close to the exit road to Madrid, which produced whirlpools and had devastating 
effects on the breakwater.  
     Not only the San Blas gully, but also that of Canicia, which reached the city 
from the northeast, caused damage whenever there were heavy rains. Its natural 
route was the current Rambla de Méndez Núñez. Therefore it entered the city 
through part of the trench, causing problems in the trading warehouses and other 
buildings. The City Council, the Consulate of the port authority and city trade 
tried by every means possible to obtain permission to close the entry grills of 
these waters to the city whereas those on the side of war did everything in their 
power to prevent this happening. This arrangement entailed making the waters 
flow through the trench, the Bavel front and the San Carlos bastion, and 
inevitably caused damage to the walls and foundations. The solution to the 
problem was a complex one.  
     The badly constructed works of the new canal gave way in 1783 with fierce 
torrents of water flowing through again causing considerable damage to the San 
Carlos bastion. It required urgent repairs. Some interesting new projects were 
designed such as those of 1783, 1785 and 1786, by the engineers Pedro Antonio 
Molina, Antonio Exarch, and Baîme Anphoux, respectively. Subsequently there 
were further similar projects designed by Carlos Desnaux and the Conde de 
Aranda, who intervened, urged by the City Council, the Consulate and the city’s 
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traders. The most interesting project was designed in 1792 by Gerónimo de la 
Rocha y Figueroa, Engineer and Commandant of Alicante stronghold, following 
new damage suffered as a result of the rains of the previous year.  The problem 
was adequately resolved but the solution did not satisfy the city. It consisted of a 
“portion of covered ditch in the Trincheron trench from the port of San Francisco 
to the stone grills; and raising two beds on the pavements of the Barranquet 
street”. The waters continued to enter the walls, although with measures to 
prevent damage to the buildings, and only in the case of heavy rains would the 
overflow of water drain through the San Francisco trench. Its goal was to 
preserve at all cost any possible damage to the city fortifications.  
     In the early hours of 7 to 8 September 1793, further fierce torrents of water 
poured in, this time through the San Blas gully, which seems to have been 
forgotten over the years by the engineers responsible and the civil authorities 
alike, perhaps because it was the Canicia waters that had caused the most 
damage in recent times. The effects on the San Carlos bastion were devastating. 
The Canicia had also caused problems in some buildings in the interior. Despite 
the royal approval for the works they were not carried out. The debate continued 
over who was responsible for the cost. 
5 The military engineer, Leandro Badarán’s plan:  
a proposal with three variants 
The latent preoccupation with the possibility of French troops disembarking in 
Alicante revived the need to protect the city from attack. It was unlikely that the 
enemy would attack a city fortified with a castle with such natural defences, 
however, the military engineers were commissioned to carry out a 
reconnaissance of the fortifications, and assess their situation, their defects and 
the artillery available. The Mayor of Alicante Josef Romeo ordered the report. It 
was drawn up by Leandro Badarán, Chief Engineer of the Cartagena fortification 
works, who was asked to take on the task given his experience and skills in the 
field [11]. 
     Leandro Badarán’s professional qualifications have not been studied in any 
depth until now. Through examination of the documentation preserved at the 
Institute of Military History and Culture in the copy directed by Aparici in 
the 19th century XIX on documents in the Simancas General Archive, and 
Capel’s works on military engineers in Spain in the 18th century XVIII [12], it is 
possible to sketch a brief outline. We know that in 1763 he was Sub-lieutenant of 
Engineers which according to Royal Decree of 1756 was that of Draughtsman 
Engineer. That same year he left Valencia to work in Navarra. In 1773 he was 
transferred to Galicia, remaining there only for a short time, as we know that he 
carried out several civil architecture and religious projects in Chile from 1775 to 
1785–1786, when he was transferred from La Coruña to Extremadura. He must 
have stayed there only a short time as that same year he signed the copy of a new 
project proposed for the total drainage of the Almajar de Cartagena, drawn up by 
Juan Ordovás. In 1788, having been assigned to Valencia, he was once more 
transferred to Cartagena. Until that moment he had risen progressively from 
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Extraordinary Engineer to Ordinary and Second Engineer with a grade 
equivalent to Lieutenant Colonel. In October 1790 he worked in Orán, and from 
there he went to Alicante. He subsequently rose to the post of Chief Engineer in 
the district of Valencia, the rank just below the highest, that of Engineer General, 
a post which at the time of our research was held by Francisco Sabatini. From his 
work we can deduce that although he was not responsible for many fortification 
projects his work as an architect between 1774 and 1786 was prodigious. That 
experience was enriched by the project for channelling the river Mapocho in 
Chile in order to efficiently resist its surging torrents. This experience would be 
the best guarantee of his being commissioned to carry out his subsequent work in 
Alicante. 
 
 
Figure 5: Plan showing the San Blas gully and the canal that was opened, 
Leandro Badarán, 7 December 1794, AGS. M, P and D. IV-164. 
     The Badarán report of 23 November 1794, is as accurate as it is extensive and 
provides a glimpse of his experience and knowledge in fortification matters [13]. 
His report could be summarised by saying that the large trench was extremely 
easy to attack, that all this part of the city was dominated by the Montañeta de 
San Francisco, that the San Antonio battery was hindered in its defence by the 
houses of the San Francisco neighbourhood and that the San Antón settlement –
outside the walls – could not be defended even from the castle. As to the San 
Carlos bastion, it was under threat from rifle fire from a small rise and therefore 
shoulders needed to be built to safeguard the batteries. The Castle of Santa 
Bárbara was not easy to attack or scale, however, it had the disadvantage that it 
could be attacked by battery from the mountain of San Julián, and therefore it 
was necessary to create bombproof arches in its buildings, in addition to 
protecting the batteries with shoulders of wooden planks or sacks of earth. He 
ordered a count of all the artillery pieces in the stronghold and proposed that 
some of the weapons should be diverted to Cartagena, a stronghold where a 
8  Defence Sites III: Heritage and Future
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priori it would be easier for the enemy to disembark. In order to defend the castle 
of Alicante, 550 men were needed, 56 of whom would be artillery men and 168 
would provide support to the artillery. There should be no more, as in the event 
of blockade they would consume too much food and water. In addition, there 
were not sufficient constructions to safeguard the troops.  This report was 
submitted to the Court.  
     Soon after the report was drafted, on 7 December, Badarán once again drew 
up a new project to divert the source of the San Blas gully. Thus the king had 
ordered on the 26 May. It was based on the premise that prior to proceeding to 
repair the San Carlos bastion, the question of diverting the gully should be 
resolved. It was a priority as there was no point in repairing the bastion if there 
would be further flooding within the next few years. Looking back on the history 
of repairs carried out until that time, several  errors stood out; firstly, the full 
width of the old canal had not been closed with the large wall, which moreover, 
had become considerably weak, and secondly the width of the new canal was 
insufficient.  
     The report was no less critical when evaluating “its failure to be in a straight 
line, or the direction of the right feet of the Bridge which is that which naturally 
carries the waters as they flow out”. Because they flowed out obliquely with 
respect to the canal mouth – looping throughout its route – they were causing 
problems in the major wall. Finally, it was added that the fact that the earth walls 
of the water source were not cut with the natural inclination of their consistency 
was a disadvantage, as they collapsed more easily; the canal had not been 
extended to the sea; and the disadvantage that the levels of the canal bed were 
badly designed with “raised areas, dips and other unevenness” and the waters 
reached considerable speeds at some points. Many of these defects had been 
described in previous projects, however, the accuracy with which Badarán 
describes the causes which have led to these issues is striking.   
     There is no room here to refer to all the points of the project. It concerned 
construction of a large wall, able to align as adequately as possible the direction 
of the waters towards the canal, widening it and extending it to the sea, providing 
it with adequate earthworks. In the extension towards the sea it was appropriate 
to “continue the cut of the banks, making them wider at the end, as the plan 
states, so that the waters flow more freely, and have room to spread out, if 
anything detains them, there will be an inevitable meeting and swell from the sea 
water”.  He considered that the most important part of the project was to ensure a 
perfect plane of the canal bed with continuous inclination “which is such a slight 
inclination that it cannot cause any collapse or damage to the banks, as it would 
do if the water were to flow at a higher speed should the slope be greater. In 
order to create the base or plane of the Canal with this uniform inclination, all 
the dips and cracks would be filled in from the bridge up to the Canal entrance 
along with those in its mouth, using earth cut from its banks, treading down well, 
having been laid in layers, watered to ensure cohesion, and excavating or 
lowering the earthworks in some of the areas where they form high points”. This 
technical prescription demonstrates the technical quality of Badarán’s project. 
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 Figure 6: Detail of the plan of Alicante, surveyed and drawn by Henry du 
Vernet, 1812, National Archives, WO-78-1017-3-22. 
     In fact, the engineer showed three projects in one as the flow could be 
diverted in three ways. The first consisted of leaving the route of the watercourse 
as it was done in 1772, with the original attributes and forming a wall that would 
close the whole access to the former water course, reinforcing it with a 
breakwater using earth from the excavations to be carried out. The total cost 
would be 461.365 reales and 17 maravedis. The second method would be to 
create a totally new water course displaced to the west, and parallel with the 
existing one, in order to make the waters flow in a straight line. A similar wall 
would need to be constructed in order to close the flow to the former water 
course. The excavation earth would be dumped in the canal of 1772. The cost of 
the works would be 574.115 reales and 17 maravedis. And the third option was a 
simple variant on the first, in which Badarán was definitely taking a risk. The 
costs of materials and manpower had grown immeasurably in recent times, by a 
third more. And he saw removal of the wall as a way of reducing costs so that 
the task of directing the waters would be undertaken by the earth breakwater. In 
this way the cost of the works would be 317.450 reales. He recommended in 
every case making contracts per item or with piece work in order to make the 
works more economical. 
     On 18 February 1795, the Engineer General Francisco Sabatini decided that 
Badarán’s project was too expensive, and that a way should be found to lower 
the cost [14]. He decided to follow Badarán’s last proposal, removing the wall 
and making an earth breakwater with some small variations. The city and traders 
in Alicante would need to pay for the works, as they would be the ones who 
would gain the most benefit from the works. On 5 March the King approved 
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Sabatini’s proposal. We know through some plans and subsequent documents, 
especially those of the War of Independence, that the project for completing the 
new water course for the San Blas Gully was not implemented. Priority was 
given instead to constructing the fort of San Fernando, on the Tossal hill which 
overlooked the city. 
6 Conclusions 
During the 17th and 18th centuries the increased port activity in Alicante led to 
the need for extramural buildings beyond the fortifications to fulfil the needs of 
trade warehouses and residential settlements. During the War of Succession the 
English troops built a trench leaving the city of Alicante open to the devastating 
effects of the waters of the San Blas and Canicia gullies. This had negative 
consequences for the port, the fortifications and some buildings concerned with 
trade. Similar situations were experienced in the fortifications of other 
Mediterranean strongholds such as Gerona, Málaga or Cartagena. 
     In 1721 the General Engineer Jorge Próspero de Verboom drew up an 
ambitious project for the Alicante fortifications. It proposed diversion of the 
waters of the San Blas gully by means of a canal which would divert the flow of 
waters to the sea. In 1772 the canal was opened. It was built with scant financial 
resources and therefore the entire route was not constructed, its depth was not 
fully excavated and its base was not made sufficiently firm, and the former water 
source was closed off with a weak breakwater. Subsequent episodes of torrential 
flooding exposed these disadvantages. Between 1780 and 1798 some projects 
were drawn up in order to improve the canal. In 1794 the engineer Leandro 
Badarán offered three project alternatives based on the available resources. It 
was an intelligent project adapted to the scarcity of Treasury funds, and was 
supported with the collaboration of the city authority and tradesmen. The 
Engineer General Francisco Sabatini, opted for the third solution, a large wall 
raised and consisting solely of earth for diverting the waters. The king approved 
the project although it was never executed. The only investment in the city 
defence was made during the War of Independence with the construction of the 
fort of San Fernando. 
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